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Reducing Polarization: Some Facts for
Reformers
Nolan McCartyt

ABSTRACT
In response to the governance problems associated with excessive party
polarization in American national and state governments, many
reformers now seek to alter existing electoral institutions to reduce
polarization and its effects. Unfortunately, many existing proposals are
based on premises that lack empirical foundation. This essay outlines a
set of empirical regularitiesabout polarization in the United States that
have important implications for the appropriateness and efficacy of
reform proposals. In the conclusion, I outline some approaches to
polarizationthat are consistent with the empirical facts.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 3, 2015, the New York Times published an
article entitled "Departing Lawmakers Bemoan the Lack of
Compromise."' The article features four departing members of
Congress with a combined 120 years of legislative experience.
The lawmakers include two Democrats, Senator Tom Harkin of
Iowa and Representative Henry Waxman of California, and two
Republicans, Senator Saxby Chambliss and Representative Jack
Kingston, both of Georgia. Notably, the two Democrats were
known as staunch liberals while the two Republicans were
reliable conservatives. Yet, all four decry the effects of the
partisan and ideological polarization which they believe has led
to serious erosion of the capacity of Congress to get things done.
Each former legislator recalls past bipartisan compromises
t Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School
and Department of Politics, Princeton University, nmccarty@princeton.edu.
1 Carl Hulse and Robert Pear, Departing Lawmakers Bemoan the Lack of
Compromise, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), available at http:I/www.nytimes.com/
archived
2015/01/03/us/politics/departing-lawmakers-lament-capitols-partisanship.html,
at http://perma.cc/7D7N-C97B.
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that they doubt could be accomplished
in today's
political environment.
What is remarkable about the story, however, is how
unremarkable it is. Such articles have become a staple following
every federal election and notable legislative retirement. Even
Congressional obituaries routinely contrast the Congress of old
with today's less functional institution. 2
Clearly, retiring legislators are not the only ones concerned
about partisan polarization in Washington and its impact on
governance. Political scientists have devoted considerable
attention to developing an understanding of the origins of
political polarization and its effects on policymaking. 3 At the
same time, journalists and reform activists have also become
interested in polarization, especially in terms of what can be
done about it.4

2 A typical passage following the death of Senator Edward Brooke: "A skilled
coalition builder at a time when Congress was less ideologically divided than it is today,
Mr. Brooke shunned labels, but he was seen as a centrist. His positions and votes were
consistently more liberal than those of his increasingly conservative Republican
colleagues." Douglas Martin, Edward W Brooke III, 95, Senate Pioneer, Is Dead, NEW
YORK TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/20l5/01/04/us/edwardbrooke-pioneering-us-senator-in-massachusetts-dies-at-95.html,
archived at http://
perma.cc/SV9P-S6LY.
For a recent review of the political science literature on polarization, see generally
Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization,
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS, (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds.,

2013). For additional academic perspectives see also Nolan McCarty, What we know and
don't know about our polarized politics, WASHINGTON POST'S MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 8
2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/08/
what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-our-polarized-politics/, archived at http://perma.cc/
8VPN-X829.

For a sampling, see, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, THE NEW
YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/12/08/thegreat-election-grab, archived at http://perma.cc/UX7U-F79J; JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT
CLUB POLITICS: How PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); MICKEY EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE: How TO
TURN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS INTO AMERICANS (2012); Robert Draper, The

League of Dangerous Mapmakers, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/, archived at
http://perma.cc/6WSN-ZB2R; Joe Nocera, Fixing the System, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov.
4, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/opinion/nocera-fixing-thesystem.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KNA8-PP7P; Adam Nagourney, CaliforniaSees
Gridlock Ease in Governing, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/us/california-upends-its-image-of-legislative-dysfun
ction.html, archived at http://perma.cc7N62-KMS7; Amy Walter, Primary Colors: To
Change Congress Start with the Primaries, THE COOK POLITICAL REPORT (Oct. 16, 2013),
available at http://cookpolitical.com/story/6309, archived at http://perma.cc/DLL2-4WVV;
Charles Schumer, End PartisanPrimaries, Save America, NEW YORK TIMES (July 21,
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While a wide variety of ideas have been discussed in
journalistic and reform circles, the most common prescriptions
for reducing polarization tend to fall into one of three areas.
Perhaps the most common suggestion is that "gerrymandered"
legislative districts are a significant source of polarization and
that turning redistricting decisions over to non-partisan bodies
can reduce legislative conflict. The second argument centers
around the use of partisan primaries to nominate legislative
candidates. If primaries were more open to moderate and
independent voters, so the theory goes, those elections would be
considerably less likely to produce extreme nominees. Finally,
many observers blame the legislators' reliance on campaign
contributions from groups and citizens with extreme
preferences. Accordingly, public financing of campaigns, limits
on large donors, and/or subsidies for small donors have been
proposed to battle polarization.
Unfortunately, when it comes to polarization, academic and
public discussions are often completely out of sync. In most
cases, the reform agenda is based on premises that have been
outright rejected by the academic consensus. In other cases, the
proposals proffered lack solid social scientific evidence to back
the claims.
Consider the claims about gerrymandering. The argument
fails a simple test-it cannot explain the near-parallel
polarization of the U.S. Senate, which has obviously never been
redistricted. Nor can gerrymandering explain how House
members from states with a single congressional district (also
not subject to gerrymandering) have also become more extreme.
In more sophisticated studies, the estimated effects of
gerrymandering on the House range from small 5 to nearly nil.6
2014), available at http: /www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/opinion/charles-schumer-adoptthe-open-primary.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4P65-ZQUA; Powering Down, THE
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
8,
2014),
available
at
http: //www.economist.com/
news/briefing/2 1631049-voters-have-chosen-change-americas-political-system-makes-fartoo-hard-powering-down, archived at http: /perma.cclQ7UW-WJQV.

SEAN
6

M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS Chapter 4 (2008).

Thomas E. Mann, Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much Does

GerrymanderingMatter?, in RED AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF

AMERICA'S POLARIZED POLITICS (Peitro Nivola & David Brady eds. 2006); NOLAN
McCARTY, KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF

IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006); Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole & Howard
Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, AM. J. POL. SCi. 53(3):666-80
(2009); Seth E. Masket, Jonathan Winburn & Gerald C. Wright, The Gerrymanderers
Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won't Affect Competition or PolarizationMuch, No

246

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2015

Yet the idea is so persistent that a prominent political scientist
has labeled it a "zombie" idea-one that is dead but cannot be
killed.'
Arguments about the polarizing effect of partisan primary
elections also do not stand up well to academic scrutiny. First,
the timing is all wrong. Primaries have tended to become more
open to participation by independents as polarization has
increased.8 Second, arguments about partisan or "closed"
primaries have been rejected by statistical analyses. 9 Perhaps
the most popular reform proposal is to do away with partisan
primaries altogether and nominate general election candidates
via the non-partisan "top-two" system recently adopted by
California. Under the "top-two" system, a non-partisan primary
is held where the top two vote getters (regardless of party) move
to the general election ballot. 10 Because the top-two reform is
relatively recent, there is not a lot of data, but the early returns
are decidedly mixed." The arguments about primaries may not
yet be zombies, but they indeed are on life support.
Matter Who Does It, PS: POL. Sol. Jan.: 39-43 (2012).
John Sides, Zombie Politics: Redistricting and Party Polarization, THE MONKEY
CAGE (Oct. 12, 2012), available at http://themonkeycage.org/2012/10/21/zombie-politicsredistricting-and-party-polarization/, archived at http: /perma.cc/9ACB-4KD5.
8 Hirano et al. have studied the history of Senate primaries and found that the
introduction of a primary had no effect on polarization in the Senate. They also refuted a
common corollary argument that primaries have become polarizing because turnout has
fallen-it turns out primary turnout has always been low. Shigeo Hirano, James
M. Snyder Jr., Stephen Ansolabehere, & John Mark Hanson, Primary Elections and
PartisanPolarizationin U.S. CongressionalElections, Q.J. POL. SC. 5(2):169-91 (2010).
9 Using a panel of state-legislative elections, McGhee et al. found no evidence that
switching away from closed primaries reduced the level of polarization. Eric McGhee,
Seth E. Masket, Boris Shor, Steven Rogers & Nolan McCarty, A Primary Cause of
Partisanship?Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology, AM. J. POL. Sci. 58(2):33751 (2014).
'0 Reformers generally argue that moderate candidates would be advantaged by
such a system because some supporters of the minority party will support the more
moderate candidate of the majority party, which will lead to the nomination and victory
of moderates.
" Bullock and Clinton investigated California's short-lived move from a closed
primary to a blanket primary in which any registered voter can vote for candidates of
either party. (A blanket primary differs from a top-two primary only in that a top-two
primary may result in two general election candidates of the same party. In the
California blanket primary, the highest Republican and Democratic vote-getters moved
to the general election.) They found that the change led to more moderate candidates in
competitive districts, but not in districts where one party had a clear majority. Thus,
their study provides little reassurance that blanket or top-two primaries are a solution to
the problem of a lack of inter-party competition. Will Bullock & Joshua D. Clinton, More
a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the Blanket Primary on Elected Officials'
Behavior from California, J. POL. 73(3):915-30 (2011). In a more recent study, Ahler,
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Campaign finance is an area in which the reformers may be
onto something. While the research is preliminary, there is
growing evidence that certain features of our campaign finance
system do contribute to polarization. But as I discuss below, the
implications of research in this area are often not those
presumed by reformers focused on financial contributions of
corporations and the wealthy. In fact, campaign finance reform
targeting polarization may run counter to many other
worthwhile objectives.
In the hopes of closing the gap between academic
scholarship and the discussions of reform advocates, this article
takes up two tasks. The first is to present a set of facts and
empirical regularities about polarization that are often missing
from discussions about the remedies for polarization. 12 A
knowledge and appreciation of these facts not only helps one to

Citrin and Lenz conduct an experiment in which voters are randomly provided either a
"top-two" style non-partisan ballot or a closed partisan ballot. They find that moderate
candidates fared no better on the top-two ballot. They provide additional evidence that
indicates that voters were unable to discern the more moderate candidate when
presented the option to vote for her. Douglas J. Ahler , Jack Citrin, & Gabriel S. Lenz,
Do Open Primaries Help Moderate Candidates? An Experimental Test on the 2012
California Primary, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY (Forthcoming). Kousser, Phillips

&

and Shor actually find that the top-primary made things worse as representatives
became less tied to the median voter of their district. Thad Kousser, Justin Phillips
Boris Shor, Reform and Representation: A New Method Applied to Recent Electoral
Changes, (Aug. 19, 2015), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=2260083, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q3M9-PHTE. Because California implemented its Citizens Redistricting
Commission at the same time as the top-two primary, it is not clear which reform
generated the perverse outcome. One research report finds a moderating effect of
California's redistricting and primary reform by comparing legislative voting in short
windows just before and after the reforms were implemented. CHRISTIAN GROSE, THE
ADOPTION OF ELECTORAL REFORMS AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE

LEGISLATURE (The Schwarzenegger Institute ed., 2014). It is not clear however whether
those patterns will persist over the long run. No moderating effects are apparent in
updates to the Shor and McCarty data on state legislative ideology (these measures are
discussed below). Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American
Legislatures, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 105(3):530-51 (2011).
12 In the discussion that follows, I maintain the presumption that it would be
desirable to reduce legislative polarization. Of course, some degree of party
differentiation is healthy for a democracy as it provides clear choices to voters and makes
it easier to hold elected officials accountable. In fact, in the 1950s a task force of the
American Political Science Association argued that the central problem in American

politics was a lack of polarization. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, TOWARD
A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL
PARTIES OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION (1950). But in a case of rare

agreement, the academic literature tends to concur with the popular sentiment that
polarization has reached a level such that its costs exceed its benefits. See Nolan
McCarty, The Policy Effects of PoliticalPolarization,in TRANSFORMATIONS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007).
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understand why the evidence in favor of popular reforms is often
so weak, but also why some measures may ultimately be
counterproductive. The second objective is to plant some
plausible reform ideas that do not contradict important
empirical regularities and have at least some tentative support
in recent political science scholarship. My intention is not to
present well-worked-out reform proposals. In fact, I would
withhold my endorsement from some on the basis of my
concerns about unintended consequences. My suggestions are
merely intended to nudge the discussion of electoral reform back
in the direction of the evidence.
II.

TRENDS IN POLARIZATION

One important set of facts omitted from most discussions of
our contemporary polarized politics is the history of how we
reached the current high levels of party conflict. It is neither
true that "it has always been this bad" nor is it true "that it has
never been this bad."1 3 To get some sense of the history, Figure 1
presents a measure of congressional polarization in the United
States House and Senate developed by McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal known as DW-NOMINATE.1 4 Underlying DWNOMINATE is a statistical model that estimates the
liberal/conservative position of legislators based on observed roll
call voting behavior. Larger estimated scores represent more
conservative positions. The simplest way to understand the
statistical model is that it associates a conservative position for
legislators who vote often with conservatives and never with
liberals. Liberals are those who vote with other liberals and
never with conservatives whereas moderates are those who vote
with both liberals and conservatives. 15 The DW-NOMINATE
scores of individual legislators are aggregated into these
measures so that the polarization measure is just the average
difference in the scores of Republicans and Democrats. 16
13

The argument for the latter proposition is a bit stronger, however.

NOLAN
McCARTY,
KEITH T.
POOLE & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL,
REDISTRIBUTION AND THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1997).
14

INCOME

1' See id. For a more extensive discussion of the measurement, see McCarty, Poole
& Rosenthal, supra note 6.
16 An important feature of DW-NOMINATE is that we can
use overlapping cohorts
of legislators to make inter-temporal comparisons about the degree of polarization. For
example, we can establish that in relative terms Ted Cruz is more conservative than
John Tower even though they never served in the Senate together. We can do this by
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The first takeaway of Figure 1 is that the level of
polarization in Congress has varied dramatically over the course
of the Democrat-Republican party system that followed
Reconstruction. Not surprisingly, congressional polarization was
quite high following the Civil War and Reconstruction. But it
declined markedly from the 1920s to the 1950s where the
greatest declines appear to be associated with the Great
Depression and World War II. Partisan differences in Congress
remained at fairly low levels from the 1950s to the 1970s.
During this period, both the Democrats and Republicans were
divided ideologically between liberal and conservative wings.17
The current trend towards greater and greater polarization
began in the late 1970s and was detectable by academics as
early as

1982.18 This

fact lies uncomfortably

against

any

narrative that pivots on a single event or "great person." The
trend precedes the election of Ronald Reagan, the "Borking" of
Robert Bork, the impeachment of Bill Clinton, and the election
of Barack Obama. I dare say that if the x-axis labels of Figure 1
were removed, even the most astute political observers would be
hard pressed to locate those events on the figure. Furthermore,
these long-term patterns alone raise skepticism about the
potential efficacy of many proposed reforms. Consider that
gerrymandering was less legally constrained, campaign finance
less regulated, and primaries more closed during the less
polarized 1950s than they are today. 19
The second takeaway point is that the House and the
Senate have remarkably similar histories with respect to

leveraging that John Tower served with Phil Gramm who served with Kay Hutchison,
who served with John Cornyn who served with Ted Cruz.
17 Indeed, the intra-party divisions were so great that the American Political
Science Association commissioned a report arguing for more partisanpolarization.
's See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Polarizationof American Politics, J.
POL. 46(04):1061-79 (1984).
19 Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
legislative districts were not constrained to have equal populations and courts rarely
intervened in districting cases. The modern infrastructure for regulating campaign
finance was not created until the Federal Election Commission Act of 1974. The number
of closed legislative primaries has fallen sharply over the period of increased
polarization. In 1982, 20 states had closed primaries for both the Democratic and
Republican parties. In 2012, there were only 13 closed Republican primaries and 12
closed Democratic primaries. See Eric McGhee, Open Primaries,California Public Policy
Institute 2010 (technical appendix), available at http: /www.ppic.org/content/pubs/
for the
archived at http://perma.cc/3RZB-MBJD,
other/210EMAI-appendix.pdf,
underlying data.
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polarization. The two time series tend to decline together,
stabilize together, and increase together. Generally, there is a
little less polarization in the Senate, but there are periods in
which the Senate was the more polarized body. Although
polarization in the Senate leveled off in the early 2000s, it has
increased faster than it has in the House over the past halfdozen years.
The similar trajectories of the House and Senate also have
implications for evaluating reform ideas. Any compelling reform
proposal ought to be one which addresses a mechanism present
in both the House and the Senate. For example, Figure 1 casts
doubt on the importance of congressional districting reform
since one cannot blame gerrymandering for Senate polarization.
Explanations specific to the Congress and national politics
also contradict the findings of Shor and McCarty, who develop
measures of state legislative polarization since the 1990s that
are comparable to those used for Congress. 20 They find that on
average state legislatures have become more polarized over time
(although there is variation across states). 21 Moreover, they find
that most state legislatures are more polarized than the U.S.
House.22

20
21
22

See generally Shor & McCarty, supra note 11.
id.
Id.

243]

REDUCING POLARIZATION

251

C4

Fd~igue1

Thgue

oarztoanth

:Polarizationesristedfrnc

..

Cnges17-01.Cmue

in the mean soges18721.Coreufor

Republicans and the mean score for Democrats.

Figure 2 presents a third historical fact about polarization
that is important to keep in mind when discussing reform.
Rather than a case of both parties moving toward the extremes,
polarization over the past forty years has been very asymmetric.
It is overwhelmingly associated with the increased movement of
Republican legislators to the right. Each new Republican cohort
has compiled a more conservative record than the returning
cohort. Importantly, this has been the case since the 1970s, it is
not a reflection of the emergence of the "Tea Party" movement
in 2009.23
The Democratic party has not followed a similar pattern.
While some new cohorts are more liberal than the caucus on
average, many are more moderate. The slight movement of the

23 At least in the case of the Senate, the Tea Party might have decreased
polarization through its support of extreme candidates such as Christine McDonnell,
Richard Mourdock, and Todd Akin that ultimately cost the Republican party seats that
were won by moderate Democrats.
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Democratic party to the left can be accounted for by the increase
of African-American and Latino legislators in its caucus. Outside
of majority-minority districts, the average position of the
Democratic party has changed very little.24

-

epubream

- -=-

Democuis

Figure 2: Party Positions in the U.S. House 1877-2014. Figure shows
average DW-NOMINATE scores by party.

III. PATTERNS OF POLARIZATION

The next set of facts are based on the pattern of polarization
across legislative districts. There are two logical ways in which a
legislative body can be polarized. 25 The first is what I call
geographic sorting. Polarization due to sorting occurs when
liberal Democrats are increasingly likely to win elections in
liberal districts and conservative Republicans are increasingly
likely to represent conservative districts. Such sorting can
produce polarization even when the parties differ very little in
24 While there is more
variation in the movements of the Democratic and
Republican parties at the state level, Republicans have become more extreme on average
in state legislatures. Asymetric Polarization in State Legislatures? Yes and No,

MEASURING

AMERICAN LEGISLATURES,

available at http://americanlegislatures.com/

2013/07/29/partisan-polarization-in-state-legislatures/,
archived at http://perma.cc/
T2W3-7K3C.
25 For a more extensive discussion, see McCarty,
Poole & Rosenthal, supra note 6.
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how they represent moderate districts. Such a hypothetical
pattern is shown in the left panel of Figure 3. In the figure, the
x-axis represents the conservatism of the district while the yaxis represents the conservatism of the representative. The
Democrats (token D) represent almost all of the liberal districts
and the Republicans (token R) represent almost all of the
conservative districts. But Democrats and Republicans
represent the moderate districts very similarly. This
hypothetical legislature would have a polarization score of .9.

(a) Sorung

(b) D ergans

Figure 3: Polarizationfrom Sorting and Divergence. The panels show
the relationship between voter preferences and legislative positions
for two hypothetical legislatures. In panel (a), the legislature is
polarized due to the sorting of Republicans legislators into
conservative districts and Democratic legislators into liberal districts.
In panel (b), the legislature is polarized because Democrats and
Republicans represent districts in divergent ways. "D" represents
Democratic members and "R" represents Republican members.

The second pattern is what I call divergence. Divergence
occurs when Democratic and Republican legislators represent
26
otherwise identical districts in increasingly extreme ways.
Consequently, divergence leads to polarization even if there is a
low correlation between the party of the representative and the
preferences of the median voter of her constituency. Panel (b) of
Figure 3 illustrates polarization due to divergence. In that
panel, both Democrats and Republicans represent liberal and
Such a pattern is also consistent with what Bafumi and Herroncall "leapfrog"
representation where liberal and conservative legislators rotate in office with the same
constituency. Joseph Bafumi and Michael C Herron, Leapfrog Representation and
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and their Members in Congress, AM. POL. SCl.
26

REV. 104(3):519-42 (2010).
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conservative districts, but there is a gap between the parties at
each level of district conservatism. The hypothetical legislature
in panel b also has a polarization score of .9.
These different forms of polarization have distinct
implications for reform possibilities. If polarization is a matter of
sorting, then reforms to reduce the number of extreme districts
or those designed to enhance inter-party competition make
sense. But if polarization is primarily caused by with-in district
divergence, such reforms may be ineffectual or even
counter-productive. 27
The available evidence shows that the contemporary trend
is mostly a process of divergence. This pattern is demonstrated
by comparing the two panels of Figure 4.

27

McCarty et al., supra note 3, at 20.
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The figure plots DW-NOMINATE scores against Republican
presidential vote for two congressional terms. A lowess
smoothing line is included for each party. The widening gap
between the parties at each level of presidential vote indicates
greater divergence.
This figure plots the conservatism score for each House
member against the Republican presidential vote (a measure of
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district conservatism) for two different elections-1972 and
2004. A local regression line is included for each party to show
the expected conservatism of a member for a given level of
presidential vote. A larger gap between these lines indicates a
greater degree of divergence. A simple comparison reveals how
the gap between the parties for moderate districting has grown
since the 1970s. The sorted districts are overwhelmingly urban
and minority districts. Note that there are few sorted
Republican districts even though it is the Republicans that have
polarized the most.
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal report that almost two-thirds
of the increase in polarization between 1972 and 2004 can be
accounted for by divergence. 28 Shor and McCarty also find that
divergence rather than sorting is the dominant pattern in state
legislatures. 29 In all but four states, they find that divergence
accounts for more than 80% of the level of polarization.
In sum, any proposed reform for tackling polarization must
account for the fact that Democrats and Republicans represent
nearly identical districts in very distinctive ways. As McCarty,
Poole and Rosenthal argue, a focus on gerrymandering is hard to
square with divergence-based polarization. 30 The underlying
hypothesis linking gerrymandering to polarization is that
politicians draw maps that minimize electoral competition.
Thus, if gerrymandering were to be the cause of polarization, the
mechanism would certainly have to be through greater sorting.
However, gerrymandering provides no explanation as to why
Republicans and Democrats would represent moderate districts
in increasingly divergent ways.
IV. POLARIZATION AND ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS

A common belief among reformers is that polarization is
strongly associated with declining inter-party electoral
competition. This assumption is most clearly held by those who
propose districting reform. The "gerrymandering" hypothesis is
based on the notion that state legislators draw district
boundaries that artificially depress inter-party competition.
Freed of competition from the other party, legislators are then

28
29
3

McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 673 tbl. 2.
Shor & McCarty, supra note 11, at 547-48, tbl. 2 & fig. 19.
See generally McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal (2006), supra note 6.
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allowed to cater to their bases and extreme interest groups.
Arguments about primary election reform also hinge on a lack of
inter-party competition. If general elections are not competitive,
the partisans who dominate the primary electorates have very
little reason to nominate "electable" candidates who appeal to
the political center. Despite the widespread belief in declining
competition, however, the evidence that legislative elections
have become less competitive or that non-competitive elections
cause polarization is rather weak.
One of the most common ways of measuring the
competitiveness of legislative elections is to examine the
distribution of presidential vote shares across districts.3 ' The
underlying premise is that presidential vote share is a good
measure of district partisanship. Districts that vote heavily
Democratic in presidential elections are unlikely to elect
Republican representatives and vice versa. But districts that
split their presidential votes are more likely to see competitive
legislative elections. Thus, scholars have used the presidential
vote as a measure of district competitiveness on the premise
that it is uncontaminated by the legislative campaigns. 32
If legislative elections were becoming less competitive, we
would expect to see average district presidential vote share
margins growing or see fewer districts at parity in
presidential voting.

While political scientists have used presidential vote alongside a variety of other
measures of competitiveness, the use of presidential vote is very common in journalistic
and activist circles. See, e.g., Monopoly Politics, THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND
DEMOCRACY (July 23, 2012), available at http://www.fairvote.org/research-andanalysis/congressional-elections/monopoly-politics-2012/,
archived at http://perma.cc/
M5XZ-W577.
32 Suppose one were to use legislative vote shares instead. Such a measure would
conflate the underlying features of the district with decisions about candidate entry,
quality, and campaign spending.
31
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Figure 5: Average Absolute Mean Deviated Presidential Vote Margin
Across Districts. The figure is based on mean-deviated presidential
vote share for each district and for each presidential election. Each
marker shows the average absolute margin for each combination of
congressional term and presidential election.

Figure 5 shows the average absolute mean-deviated vote
share for congressional districts for all elections since 1992. For

example, a district with a 56% Democratic vote when the
average district has a 48% share has an absolute mean deviated
vote of 8. Under the same scenario, a district with a 38%
Democratic vote has a score of 10 while the average district has
a score of 0.33 So this average measures the overall level of
competitiveness where higher scores mean less competitive.
Figure 5 does appear to indicate declining competition as
the average vote margins have increased. But it is important to
note that the increase has little or nothing to do with districting.
Figure 5 plots the vote share variable for multiple presidential
elections for the same congressional districts. Thus, we can
determine how much the measure changes based on districting
and how much of the change just reflects the peculiarities of
each presidential election.
33

The main purpose of the mean deviation is to eliminate election specific effects

unrelated to the underlying competitiveness of House districts.

259

REDUCING POLARIZATION

243]

Note that redistricting in 2002 and 2012 had no impact on
the measure when the results of the same presidential election
are compared. When the 2000 election results are applied to the
pre-reapportionment districts, the average mean-deviated vote
margin is about 11.4 and rises only to 11.5 under the districts
drawn in 2002. Similarly, when the 2008 election returns are
applied to the 2010 congressional districts, the average margin
is 12, the same margin under the post-reapportionment
districts. The apparent decline in competition following the
latest reapportionment is an artifact of using the 2012
presidential election.
The use of the average margin may be misleading if what
one wants to know is how many districts are in play in any given
election year. So Figure 6 plots the percentage of districts where
the absolute mean-deviated presidential vote margin is less than
10 points. Using this measure, there was a slight decline in
competitiveness following the reapportionment in 2000-roughly
the equivalent of 8 seats. But there is no similar decline
following the 2010 reapportionment.
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Figure 6: Percentage of Districts with Normalized Margin of Less than
10%. The figure is based on mean-deviated presidential vote share for
each district and for each presidential election. Each marker shows
the percentage of districts for which the adjusted margin was less
than 10%.
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Figures 5 and 6 are consistent, however, with a decline in
electoral competition unrelated to redistricting. The most-likely
culprit is the long-term regional realignment in presidential
voting. Such a realignment is unlikely to be reversed through
electoral engineering.
Measures of electoral competitiveness based on presidential
votes have certain conceptual limitations. Ultimately, interparty competition should be measured as the ex ante likelihood
that a seat could switch partisan hands. Such ex ante measures
are difficult, but we can look at the ex post likelihood by
examining the magnitude of partisan swings over time. Figure 7
plots the absolute swing in party seat share for every election
since the 1930s as well as the associated three-election moving
average. It is hard to see any trend that matches up with the
polarization trend. The magnitude of the swings declines from
the 1930s to the 1970s when polarization was low. There is no
obvious trend following the 1970s. It appears that there may be
a new upward trend beginning in 2006. Every swing from 2006
to 2014 exceeded every swing from 1996 to 2004. So inter-party
electoral competition is far from dead.
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Figure 7: Partisan Swings in the U.S. House. The figure shows the
absolute swing in the partisan seat shares for each election from 1936
to 2014.

A second related question is whether inter-party electoral
competition affects the level of polarization in a legislature. To
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address this question, I will use the data on polarization in state
legislatures developed by Shor and McCarty. 34
First, I consider whether the number of state lower house
districts that are competitive at the presidential level correlate
with the level of polarization observed in the lower house. The
table below presents the simple correlation for three presidential
elections between lower house polarization and percentage of
districts with a presidential vote margin of less than 10%.35
Election
2000
2004
2008

Correlation
0.024
-0.014
0.391

p-value
0.865
0.930
0.025

Table 1: Correlation Between Polarization and District-Level InterParty Competition

If low levels of inter-party competition at the district level
produced higher levels of legislative polarization, we would
expect to see a negative and statistically significant correlation
for each election. There is a negative correlation, however, for
only one election. But the magnitude is very small and the pvalue indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between inter-party district-level competition and
polarization. The only statistically significant correlation is for
2008 where the correlation is positive. In sum, these data do not
suggest that district-level electoral competitiveness affects
polarization at the legislative level. 36
In summary, the evidence does not support the widely held
notion that polarization has resulted from a lack of inter-party
competition at the constituency level. Standard measures of
competitiveness based on presidential vote appear to be driven
by the particularities of the presidential elections rather than

4

Shor & McCarty, supra note 11.

Steve Rogers, Accountability in a Federal System (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princteon University) (on file with author).
36
See Thomas L. Brunell & Bernie Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting
on District Homogeneity, PoliticalCompetition, and PoliticalExtremism in the US House
of Representatives, 1962-2002, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: MAKING
INSTITUTIONS WORK (Margaret Levi, James Johnson, Jack Knight, & Susan Stokes eds.,
3

2008) (using parallel evidence to cast doubt on the idea that U.S. House polarization is
related to the degree of inter-party competition).

262

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2015

aspects of the allocation of voters across districts. Moreover,
competitiveness measured by seat swings does not appear to
have declined. Evidence from state legislatures finds no impact
of district-level competitiveness on polarization. These empirical
facts call into question the underlying arguments used to
support reforms to redistricting and primary institutions. Given
the lack of support for the underlying premises, it is not
surprising that such little evidence has been mustered from the
direct effects of gerrymandering or partisan primaries
on reform.

V.

SOME FACTS THAT RAISE REFORM POSSIBILITIES

While the evidence discussed above casts considerable doubt
on many of the most popular remedies, some recent work in
political science suggests that there may be some institutional
fixes that have the potential to reduce polarization.
Drawing on this work, I will outline three possible
approaches to polarization: homogenize legislative districts,
strengthen
parties,
and
regulate
individual
campaign
contributions (but not necessarily corporate contributions).
Many observers will find these recommendations to be counterintuitive if not perverse. Clearly, there may be other normative
considerations unrelated to polarization that may make these
reforms undesirable. So my point is not to advocate for such
changes, but to demonstrate the complex trade-offs and
potential unintended consequences of electoral reform targeted
at polarization.
A.

Creating Homogeneous Electorates

For those who contend that declining district-level interparty competition is a cause of polarization, the answer is to
create more heterogeneous districts. Such districts would be
more likely to swing back and forth between Democratic and
Republican representatives and would therefore induce
competition that would reduce the chances of electing an
extreme legislator.
Existing political science research, however, questions the
wisdom of heterogeneous legislative districts. Brunell argues
that heterogeneous districts maximize the average preference
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divergence between citizens and their representative. 3 7 To
support this argument, he shows that citizens in competitive
legislative districts report less satisfaction with Congress. 38
Gerber and Lewis show that legislators from heterogeneous
districts compile voting records less congruent with the median
voters of their district. 39 Similarly, Levendusky and Pope find
that House members representing districts with heterogeneous
voter preferences compile more extreme voting records. 40
Recently, my collaborators and I have added to the evidence
against heterogeneous districts by demonstrating how such
districts produce greater levels of partisan divergence. 4 1 Our
theoretical argument is that heterogeneity creates greater levels
of electoral uncertainty. Such uncertainty weakens the
centripetal incentives toward convergence and allows policymotivated candidates to pursue policy goals that diverge from
the preferences of the median voter.42
To provide support for this argument, we supplement the
Shor and McCarty data on the ideal points of state senators with
data on the distribution of preferences within each state senate
district. The data on citizen preferences is drawn from
Tausanovitch and Warshaw. 43 The citizen preference data is
computed by linking the responses on policy questions across a
number of large surveys to produce estimates of the liberalconservative position of over 350,000 respondents. With such a
large sample, we are able to estimate the heterogeneity of each

37 THOMAS BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION:
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA (2010).
38 See id. at 36.

WHY COMPETITIVE

3 Elisabeth R. Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences,
District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, J. POL. ECON. 112(6):1364-83
(2004).
40 Matthew S. Levendusky and Jeremy C. Pope, Measuring Aggregate-Level
Ideological Heterogeneity, LEGIS. STUD. Q. 35(2):259-82 (2010).
41
See Nolan McCarty, Jonathan Rodden, Boris Shor, Chris Tausanovitch, & Chris
Warshaw, Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization, (Working Paper, August 6, 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477157.
42
See also Randall L. Calvert, Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model:
Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence, AM. J. POL. SCI. 29(1):69-95
(1985); Donald Wittman, CandidateMotivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories, AM.
POL. Scl. REV. 77(1):142-57 (1983).

4 Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw. Measuring Constituent Policy
Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, J. POL. 75(2):330-42 (2013).

264

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL

FORUM

[2015

state senate district as the standard deviation of the respondent
ideal points. 44
First, we demonstrate that -polarization in a state senate is
strongly related to the average preference heterogeneity of its
districts. Figure 8 plots the state average of our measure of
heterogeneity against the difference in party medians derived
from the Shor-McCarty ideal points. The figure reveals a strong
positive correlation between the average district heterogeneity
and the polarization of the state senate. This correlation is just
as large as the correlation between polarization and the
variation of median ideal points across districts. Thus, the
variation of voter preferences within districts matters as much
as the variation across districts.
Unlike many arguments about polarization which are
predicated on ideological sorting across districts, our argument
explicitly predicts that the link between polarization and district
heterogeneity operates through divergence. Thus, our primary
empirical finding is that Republicans and Democrats represent
heterogeneous
districts
in
divergent
ways.
Figure 9
demonstrates this point. The sample of state senate districts is
divided into three groups based on the standard deviation of
citizen preferences. For each group, the Shor-McCarty ideal
points are plotted against the mean voter preference. Clearly, as
one moves from the least heterogeneous districts to the most
heterogeneous districts, the gap between Democratic and
Republican legislators grows at each level of citizen preference.

4
We replicate our analysis for the U.S. House and for state lower chambers. The
results for the U.S. House are very similar. The results for state lower chambers are
somewhat weaker because our measures of heterogeneity are far less precise at that
level.
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Figure 8: District Heterogeneity and Legislative Polarization. The xaxis plots the average standard deviation of voter preferences across
state senate districts using the data from Tausanovitch and
Warshaw. 45 The y-axis plots legislative polarization using the
difference in party medians from Shor and McCarty.4 6

The results of Figure 9 are robust to multivariate regression
and matching models which control for a number of factors that
might confound the relationship between district heterogeneity
and partisan divergence. 47 The regression results indicate that
Democrats and Republicans representing, districts at the 75th
percentile of district heterogeneity diverge 0.1 units on the ShorMcCarty scale more than those representing districts at the
25th percentile. The magnitude of this effect is about 25% of the
inter-quartile range of polarization measures across the states.

See generally, Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 43.
See generally, Shor & McCarty, supra note 11; McCarty et al., supranote 3.
4 As an even stronger test for a causal relationship, we look at what happens when
a district goes from Republican to Democratic hands or vice versa. The resulting
difference in the ideal points of the new legislator and old legislator is considerably
larger in the heterogeneous districts, as our argument would predict.
'

46
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Figure 9: Voter Heterogeneity and Divergence. Each panel represents a
tercile of state senate districts based on the heterogeneity of citizens'
preferences. The x-axis of each panel plots the mean citizen
preference. All preference measures are derived from Tausanovitch
and Warshaw. 48 The y-axis shows the ideal point of state senators
49
from Shor and McCarty.

Inducing political competition by striving for more
heterogeneous districts runs into additional problems. Given the
strong residential clustering of citizens with similar social,
economic, and political profiles, the creation of heterogeneous
districts also certainly requires drawing what legal scholar
Nicholas Stephanopoulos calls "spatially diverse" districts.5 0
Spatial diversity refers to the variation of individual attributes
(e.g. income, race, education) across geographic space. For
example, a spatially diverse district might be one where
conservative, wealthy white neighborhoods are combined with
low income, liberal, minority neighborhoods. Stephanopoulos
argues that spatially diverse districts tend to perform poorly on
many indicators including voter engagement, participation, and
representation.5 1 But most importantly for this discussion, he
finds a greater degree of ideological polarization among

4
4
5o

See generally Tausanovitch &Warshaw, supra note 43.
See generally Shor & McCarty, supra note 11.
See generally Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARv. L. REV.

1903 (2011).
5'

See generally id.
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members of the House of Representatives who represent
spatially heterogeneous districts than those representing other
types of districts.
The upshot of these findings is that a primary objective of
redistricting should be to create legislative districts where the
vast majority of the citizens share common political preferences.
Achieving this goal will likely require greater deference to
existing municipal and administrative boundaries as well as the
relaxation of compactness constraints so that similar
communities can be connected together into districts despite
often unfavorable geographic residential patterns.
B.

Strengthening Party Organization

The academic literature and public discussions of legislative
polarization in the United States often conflate polarization and
partisanship. 52 This confusion arises naturally because the two
phenomena are hard to distinguish empirically. For example, it
is very difficult to discern whether those increased partisan
differences in legislative behavior reflect true ideological
changes or simply increased intra-party cooperation and interparty conflict. Given the difficulty of distinguishing, scholars
often
use the
terms
polarization
and partisanship
almost interchangeably.
This conflation of polarization and partisanship is relevant
for discussions of political reform. Many popular prescriptions
for reducing polarization call for decreasing the role of political
parties. But if polarization in the United States is the
consequence of relatively weak parties rather than strong
parties, as I argue may be the case, then such reforms will be
counter-productive.
To illustrate, consider two scenarios. The first is one with
strong legislative parties. Assume that parties are so strong that
they behave as unitary actors. The second scenario is one where
parties are very weak. The organizations and leaders impose no
discipline on candidates and therefore party labels convey no
information to voters.

52

See generally Nolan McCarty, Reducing Polarizationby Making PartiesStronger,

in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., Cambridge

University Press 2015).
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The strong party scenario perfectly conforms to the model
put forth by Anthony Downs. 53 In his model, as is well known,
the unified political parties have very strong incentives to
converge to the median voter. Any party that fails to position
itself in the political center will be defeated by one that does.
This convergence prediction continues to hold even if the parties
have policy preferences. So with strong parties, there is very
little polarization. Both parties cater to the preferences of the
median voter.
Now consider the weak party scenario. The autonomous
candidates of each party have incentives to converge on the
median voter in each district. Voters would be indifferent
between the candidates and would metaphorically flip coins.
Consequently, half the districts would be represented by
Democrats and half represented by Republicans. Moreover, the
Democratic districts would be statistically identical to the
Republican districts. So there is no polarization on average and
Democrats and Republicans represent districts ranging across
the spectrum. Both parties are very heterogeneous, but the
distributions of legislator positions are the same.
So neither the extremely weak nor the extremely strong
party system should be very polarized. Next consider an
intermediate case. Jim Snyder and Michael Ting offer a model
that closely approximates this middle ground. 54 In their model,
voters wish to use party labels to make more informed choices
about legislative candidates. If Republican candidates are more
conservative on average than Democratic candidates, a voter
might use this information in casting her vote in a legislative
election even if she did not know the exact locations of the
specific candidates. Snyder and Ting also assume that voters are
risk averse. So, ceterus paribus, a voter prefers the candidate
whose party label provides more precise information about that
candidate's position. In other words, voters prefer candidates
from homogeneous parties to those from heterogeneous parties.
This aspect of voter preferences gives each party a strong
incentive to screen candidates who deviate too far, left or right,
from the party's prevailing position. Strong parties are assumed
5 ANTHONY DowNs, AN EcoNOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (Columbia University
Press 1957).
5 James M. Snyder Jr. and Michael M. Ting, An Informational Rationale for
PoliticalParties, AM, J. POL. SCI. 90-110 (2002).
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to be better at screening candidates and thus better able to
reduce the variance in the positions of its candidates. A party
that can perfectly screen is equivalent to the Downsian party. If
both parties are perfect screeners, each will position itself on the
with
median voter and screen out any candidates
different positions.
But when parties are weaker, they screen candidates
imperfectly. For such parties, Snyder and Ting obtain a distinct
prediction. That such parties cannot screen out relatively more
extreme candidates forces them to position themselves away
from the median voter. Thus, weak parties will take divergent
positions. Consequently, Republican candidates will tend to win
conservative districts and Democratic candidates will win the
liberal districts. As a result, there will be considerable
polarization in equilibrium.
Polarization is only obtained in an "anti-Goldilocks" case
where the parties are not too strong nor too weak. The question
of how to best reform the party system to reduce polarization is
an empirical one-would reducing the influence of party
organization reduce polarization as some would claim, or would
it move us toward the anti-Goldilocks point with higher
polarization? If the latter, a reform agenda designed to reduce
polarization should strive to strengthen the role of party
organizations both by enhancing their role in the selection and
discipline of candidates and giving them an enhanced capacity
to withstand the pressure of extreme interest groups and voters.
To evaluate the effect of party organization on polarization,
I draw upon and extend the work of Krimmel who argues that
the national parties polarized at least in part because they were
forced to turn increasingly to organized interests for resources
as traditional partisan resources such as patronage declined.5 5
In addition to historical and archival evidence for this change in
partisan strategy, Krimmel provides some quantitative evidence
that there is lower legislative polarization in states that have
historically strong party organizations. Specifically, she finds a
state legislative
between
correlation
strong
negative

' Katherine Krimmel, Special Interest Partisanship: The Transformation of
American Political Parties in Government (unpublished PhD. thesis, Columbia
University) (on file with author).
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polarization as measured by Shor and McCarty and David
Mayhew's measure of "traditional party organizations" (TPO). 56
I now build upon Krimmel's analysis. First, I show the
bivariate relationship between the differences in party medians
for state lower and upper chambers and Mayhew's TPO scores.
Each dot represents an annual level of polarization for each
state legislature. The data covers the period of 1996 to 2008.
Both Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that on average there is a
negative relationship between polarization and historical
strength of party organizations in the state.
To further explore the relationship between polarization
and party strength, I estimated some simple regression models.
The dependent variable of each model is either a polarization
measure or a measure of the position of a party's legislative
delegation. All of these data are drawn from Shor and McCarty.
The main independent variable is Mayhew's TPO measure. I
include a small set of control variables.57

6 Mayhew classifies the state party systems of the late 1960s. He identifies states
with traditional party organizations as those with local political organizations that meet
five criteria. Such organizations 1) are largely autonomous from candidates and outside
interests, 2) have longevity, 3) use hierarchical structures, 4) try to influence
nominations for office, and 5) rely substantially more on "material" incentives than on
"purposive" incentives. That Mayhew's ratings pertain to the situation in the states
during the late Sixties has the advantage of making them plausibly exogenous to

contemporary levels of polarization.
POLITICS, (1986).

DAVID MAYHEW, PLACING PARTIES IN AMERICAN

5 First, I include Year to capture the trend toward greater polarization. Shor and
McCarty report that there is considerable heterogeneity across states as to whether
polarization is increasing or decreasing. I ignore that heterogeneity here and estimate a
single time trend. I also include an indicator South to capture regional variation in both
polarization and the prevalence of traditional party organizations. Data on Percent
African-American and Income Inequality (the Gini coefficient of family income) are also
included. For arguments linking polarization and income inequality, see McCarty, Poole
& Rosenthal, supra note 6.
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Figure 10: Polarization and Traditional Party Organization in State
Lower Chambers. Polarization is measured as the difference in the
median position of Republican and Democratic legislators drawn from

Shor and McCarty. The Measure of Traditional Party Organization is
from Mayhew.

McCarty reports the estimates of these models for lower and
upper chambers, respectively.58 In both models, states with a
recent history of traditional party organization have less
legislative polarization than those that do not. States with
traditional party organizations have -differences in party
medians that are about 0.4 lower than states with weaker party
organizations. The magnitude of this effect is equivalent to a
one-standard deviation reduction in polarization and two-thirds
of the inter-quartile range. So the correlation of party
organization and polarization is both large and statistically
significant. Importantly, the results are robust to the
inclusion of controls
racial composition.'

58

for

region,

McCarty, supra note 52, at 142, tbl. 9.1.
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Figure 11: Polarization and Traditional Party Organization in State
Upper Chambers. Polarization is measured as the difference in the
median position of Republican and Democratic legislators drawn from
Shor & McCarty, supra note 11. The Measure of Traditional Party
Organization is from Mayhew, supra note 56.

McCarty also estimates models for each party separately.5 9
The results suggest that party organization has an asymmetric
effect across parties. The effect on Democratic legislators while
positive is small and imprecise. The effect on Republican
legislators, however, is quite large. This finding is consistent
with several findings that associate the recent increases in
polarization to the rightward movement of the Republican
party.60 These conservative shifts were concentrated in states
with weaker party organizations.

5

McCarty, supra note 52, at 142, tbl. 9.1.

60

See JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION

AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005); Barber & McCarty (2013), supra
note 3, Boris Shor, Asymmetric Polarization in the State Legislatures? Yes and No,
MEASURING

AMERICAN

LEGISLATURES

BLOG

(2013),

available

at

http: /americanlegislatures.com/2013/0 7 /29/partisan-polarization-in-state-legislatures/,
archived at http://perma.cc/WHD5-YCAK; Christopher Hare, Nolan McCarty, Keith T.
Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarizationis Real (and Asymmetric), VOTEVIEW BLOG,
(2012), available at http://voteview.comlblog9p=494, archived at http://perma.cc/7EEZUA6K.
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The takeaway is that most academic observers, journalists,
and activists share a too simplistic view of the relationship
between party organizations. This view tends to blame
polarization on a strengthening of political parties. Instead, the
opposite view is better supported empirically. Perhaps instead of
sidelining parties in the nomination process and campaign
finance system, we should be enhancing the role of parties.
While America's anti-party political culture may preclude any
explicit attempt to strengthen parties, it is important to
remember that any tinkering of the campaign finance system,
or
systems,
primary nomination
rules,
congressional
redistricting may have unintended consequences related to
weakening parties. 61
Regulating Individual Campaign Contributors

C.

Following the Supreme Court's controversial decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission,62 concerns
about an influx of corporate and labor union independent
expenditures into American elections has topped the list of
concerns for reformers. While the decision and the new
campaign finance regulatory regime that it represents raises
many valid worries, political scientists have been very dubious
of any direct link between corporate and labor union election
financing and polarization. Although labor unions do tend to
concentrate their funding on liberal and pro-labor Democrats,
corporations are not nearly as ideological. While some
corporations concentrate their money on conservative, probusiness Republicans, "access-oriented" corporations spread
their largess across the ideological spectrum. As a result,
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal demonstrate that extreme
legislators obtain no fundraising advantages from corporate
political action committees (PACs). 63
But recent research has found much more promising
evidence for a different channel through which campaign finance
For complementary

arguments about strengthening parties, see Nathaniel
Persily, Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL
POLARIZATION IN AMERICA, (Nathaniel Persily ed., Cambridge University Press 2015)
herein "Persily 2015a"; Richard H. Pildes Focus on Fragmentation,Not Polarization:Re6'

Empower Party Leadership, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA

(Nathaniel Persily ed., Cambridge University Press 2015).
62 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
63 McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1146-55.
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may affect polarization-increased contribution activity by
ideological individuals. While growth contributions by political
action committee contributions have been relatively flat,
contributions from individual citizens have been growing
dramatically. Candidates have become correspondingly more
reliant on individual contributions. Barber reports that the
median federal candidate now obtains 80% of her funds from
individual donors, up from only 20% two decades ago. 6 4
Moreover, Barber and Bonica have shown that individual
contributors are far more ideological than are PACs. 6 5
Consequently, candidates for federal and state office are now far
more reliant on ideologically-motivated contributions than was
the case in the 1990s.
Barber provides two important pieces of evidence that
suggest that this rise in money from ideological individuals
contributes substantially to polarization in legislatures. First, he
finds that there is a significant correlation between the
extremity of a legislator and the percentage of campaign funds
raised from individuals. 66 Although such a correlation is
consistent with an impact of individual contributions on
polarization, it is difficult to know which way to direct the
causal arrow. Rather than ideological contributors forcing
candidates to extreme positions, it might be the case that
legislators that hold extreme positions for other reasons are
simply better at raising money from individuals or that they are
punished by organizational donors. But even if the donors are
not causing the polarization, the success of extreme legislators
in tapping into individual money can help sustain it.
Barber provides additional evidence which is more plausibly
interpreted as indicating a causal relationship between reliance
on individual contributors and polarization. He uses withinstate variation in contribution limits on individuals and PACs. 67
64 Michael J. Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization
of State Legislatures, TYPESCRIPT. BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY (2014). Figure 1. The
reliance of state candidates on individuals is 50%, also up from about 20% over the same
period. See also Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, Why
Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, J. ECON. PERSP. 27(3):103-23 (2013).
65 Michael J. Barber, supra note 64; Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological
Marketplace, AM. J. POL. SCI. 58(2):367-86 (2014).
66 See Table 3 (measuring extremity as the absolute value of the DW-NOMINATE
score for federal legislators and by the absolute value of the Shor-McCarty scores for
state legislators).
67 His research design does not utilize cross-state variation in laws due
to concerns
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Such laws provide plausibly exogenous variation in the reliance
of legislators on individual contributors. If a state has tight
limits on individual contributors, Barber argues that candidates
will be forced to seek funds from corporations, labor unions, and
PACs, and vice versa.68
Barber shows that the fundraising portfolios of legislators
are responsive to contribution limits-as individual limits are
lowered, incumbents raise less money from individuals. 69 But
the most important finding is that legislators from states with
high or no legal limits tend to have more extreme ideological
positions, ceterus paribus. In a state that switches from
unlimited individual contributions to one with limits, legislators
will moderate by about a third of a standard deviation of the
absolute values of the Shor-McCarty scores. The effect is
professionalized
more
the
in
larger
considerably
state legislatures.
But while Barber's results lend considerable support to
arguments for tighter regulation of individual contributions, his
findings about regulations on political action committees are
almost the mirror image of those for individual contributions.
Legislators are least polarized in states that have high or no
limits on PAC contributions. Thus, the reform implications may
be unsettling to some-clamp down on individuals but
deregulate PACs. 70

Tackling polarization through campaign finance reform
involves a significant dilemma. As Bonica et al. shows, small
donors are considerably more ideological and extreme than
larger donors.n While some large donors such as Charles Koch
or George Soros have very clear ideological agendas, many
wealthy contributors are more centrist and pragmatic and
employ strategies similar to corporations. Smaller contributors,

about omitted variables which might be correlated with campaign finance laws and
polarization.
See generally Barber, supra note 64.
6
Consistent with this finding, Barber also shows that tighter contribution limits
6
lead to small contributions on average and more donors "maxing out" with a contribution
at the legal limit.
' Of course, there may be many reasons unrelated to polarization for tightening
restrictions on corporate and labor union money.
n1 Bonica et al., supra note 64, at 115, fig. 7.
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however, are more likely to allocate their donations according to
ideological criteria.7 2
Yet at the same time, wealthy individuals have come to play
an increasingly outsized role in campaign finance. Figure 12
(drawn from Bonica et al.) shows how campaign contributions
have increasingly been concentrated at the top of the income
distribution. The figure presents the proportion of contributions
made by the top 0.01% of American citizens in each election
since the 1980s. In the 1980s, the top 0.01% accounted for only
10 to 15% of the total contributions in federal elections. In 2012,
more than 4 out of every $10 in contributions came from one of
these top donors. For comparison, the figure includes updates of
the Piketty and Saez estimate of the income share of the 0.01%.
Growth in the concentration of campaign contributions has
outstripped the spectacular growth of income inequality.

72

See Bonica, supra note 64, at 115-16 & fig. 7.
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Figure 12: Contribution and Income Shares of the Top 0.01%.
Contribution data from Bonica et al. and income concentration data
from Piketty and Saez updated to 2011.73 The dark line tracks the
share of campaign contributions in all federal elections donated by the
top 0.01 percent of the voting age population. The shaded line tracks
the share of total income (including capital gains) received by the top
0.01 percent of households. The figure includes individual
contributions to Super PACs and 527 organizations but excludes
contributions to nondisclosing 501c(4) organizations, which are
recorded to have spent approximately $143 million in 2010 and $318
million in 2012, much of which was raised from wealthy individuals.
Were it possible to include contributions to nondisclosing 501c's, the
trend line would likely be 1-2 percentage points higher in 2010 and
2012.

Consequently, if reformers
small donors should be targeted
But those who wish to target
political inequality should do the

want to target polarization,
at the expense of large donors.
an ever increasing source of
opposite.

1
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, "Income Inequality in the United States,
1913-1998," Q.J. ECON., 118(1), 2003, 1-39. Data update available at Facundo Alvaredo,
Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, THE WORLD TOP INCOMES
DATABASE, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Successful reforms must be based on a foundation of good
evidence. My hope is that academic research will play a more
central part in the debates about how to improve democracy and
governance in the United States. Clearly, political scientists
need to do more to engage and communicate our ideas and
findings. My hope is that this article contributes to
that endeavor. 74
But sometimes it seems that input of social scientists is not
always welcome. Those who tout certain reform ideas as
solutions to polarization often respond to contradictory academic
evidence in one of two ways. The first is to say "yes, but in the
real world. . .", to make an appeal to "common sense," and to

conclude with some personal or historical anecdote. It is hardly
worth saying that this is a terrible approach to promoting
fundamental reform of our democratic institutions. The mixture
of social, economic, and strategic considerations that underly the
creation of our partisan and ideological divisions are too complex
to be reduced to simple stories and common sense.
The second response is to say "so what? Bipartisan
redistricting commissions, non-partisan primaries, and curbs on
corporate spending are good ideas independent of any effect on
polarization." Undoubtedly, it is true that there are good nonpolarization arguments in favor of these and many other
reforms. Those are the arguments that should be made.
Marketing ideas on undeliverable benefits is surely the best way
to undermine reform.

1" See Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin, Negotiating Agreement
in Politics,
(American Political Science Association 2013); SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015).

